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The logic, features and future shape of the new financial architecture of the 
Eurozone were discussed under Chatham House Rules on the occasion of 
a high-level conference hosted in Florence on 23 April 2015, by the Euro-
pean University Institute in cooperation with Imperial College London. The 
conference was attended by central bankers, EU policy-makers, members of 
the financial industry as well as by academics. The following key conclusions 
came out from the discussion: 
1. Despite its incomplete nature, the Banking Union represents a great achieve-
ment in terms of financial stability control, thus ensuring a more resilient 
euro area. 
2. By contrast, the exact objective, scope and institutional capabilities of the 
Capital Markets Union remain a puzzle to many participants. 
3. Risks of regulatory fragmentation arising between the European Union and 
the Euro Area are somewhat exaggerated, it was overall felt. The existence of 
European platforms such as the European System of Financial Supervision 
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Background 
Meeting in June 2012, at the height of the euro crisis, Euro-
pean heads of state and government established a “Banking 
Union” with a view to breaking the deadly embrace between 
sovereigns and their home-grown banks. Following this policy 
commitment, two major mechanisms came into life to provide 
a sounder institutional framework for the euro area’s banking 
system. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), adopted in 
December 2012 and located within the European Central Bank 
(ECB), strives to improve the supervision of Euro-area banks 
by centralizing it at a supranational level. The Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism (SRM), which followed one year later, foresees 
the constitution of a privately financed resolution fund of € 55 
bn to address insolvent banks. Other elements complement 
the overall concept, although they remain to be adopted (i.e. a 
European Deposit Guarantee Scheme and a fiscal backstop) or 
fully enforced (i.e. the Single Rulebook). 
In the meantime, the entry into office of the Juncker Commis-
sion in September 2014 coincided with a new priority: estab-
lishing a European Capital Markets Union. A Green Paper was 
hence published on this topic by the Commission on 18 Feb-
ruary 2015 and it stirred a debate on the key regulatory barriers 
impeding such a Union. The creation of both a Banking Union 
and a Capital Markets Union occurs against the backdrop of 
a hectic reform activity of the European Union institutions in 
banking and finance regulation. Over the past 5 years, 41 new 
directives and regulations have been adopted to strengthen 
and reinforce Europe’s banking and financial markets regula-
tion. This caused uproar in several Member States, including 
in the United Kingdom, which heavily relies on the City for its 
prosperity. As a result, the UK has become increasingly defiant 
about integration steps taken at euro area level, leading some 
analysts to consider it as a possible argument in favour of a 
British exit from the EU (also called “Brexit”). 
Figure 1: Natacha Valla (CEPII), Mario Nava (EC) and 
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (IMF)
1. Is the Banking Union stable and 
resilient as it looks?
The first conference session revolved around the intricacies 
and challenges left open by the recently established Banking 
Union (BU). While some attendees contested the idea that 
Europe can praise itself to have a genuine Banking Union, the 
overall mood in the audience was that with the advent of the 
SSM and of the SRM substantial progress was made in terms 
of centralized supervisory and resolution capabilities. In con-
trast to earlier timid and slow attempts to promote further har-
monization steps in this domain (like the Segré Report or the 
De Larosière Report), the Banking Union materialized literally 
over a matter of weeks. Its advent coincided with an intellectual 
shift from bail-out towards bail-in considerations. There was 
however also broad agreement, despite the advances made, on 
the incomplete and at times complex nature of the BU and of its 
chaotic governance. The BU’s announcement, one participant 
claimed, was much more effective in quelling turbulences than 
its actual implementation.
Participants proved to be particularly convinced by the strength 
of the new supervisory capabilities of the SSM, backed by the 
credibility of the ECB. Nevertheless, the duplicity of roles 
between the ECB’s monetary policy function and its banking 
supervision function remains a crucial challenge faced by the 
institution. So far however, Chinese Walls seem to be opera-
tional and conflicts of interests between the SSM’s Supervisory 
Board and the ECB appear to be neutralized by the new gov-
ernance framework. Participants agreed that it was too early 
to tell whether the current governance is optimal as it was rec-
ognised that the Eurozone architecture is still in the process 
of being built-up and is likely to take more than a decade to 
reach its maturity. Criticism was stronger on the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism whose firepower remains too limited to make 
a key contribution towards financial stability.  Touching on the 
borders of the current Banking Union, one participant com-
plained about the fact that state guarantees of banks seems so 
far to be a non-issue although nothing seems to prevent the 
ECB to exclude those assets from being eligible as collateral for 
ECB credit provision. Another attendee explained that absent a 
European Deposit Guarantee Scheme, European savers would 
continue to face a fragmented system of Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme with varying values throughout Europe. Lastly, against 
the background of the coordination role it performed during 
the phase of national bail-outs, the role and scope of EU com-
petition policy in the future banking union was questioned.
Overall, some reassuring signals came from a tour d’horizon 
of the European banking sector whose fundamental health is 
sounder than a few years back. There has been considerable 
deleveraging, a substantial shift in the liability structure (from 
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wholesale funding to deposit funding) and capitalization has 
improved markedly. Several participants even claimed that 
the European banking sector is now over-capitalized com-
pared to its profitability.  However, there remain challenges in 
assessing risky assets and as a result in determining the ade-
quate risk weights. Similarly, there is no clear evidence that the 
loop between sovereigns and banks has been reduced. Lastly, 
the proclaimed single rule book is not 100% unified nor is it 
fully implemented. There are thus challenges left open on the 
Banking Union side.
Public keynote lecture: Rethinking Banking 
Supervision from an SSM perspective 
Ignazio Angeloni, Member of the Supervisory Board of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, addressed the audience in a 
public keynote1. He highlighted the peculiar nature of banking 
supervisors’ role in an intellectual dialogue with the seminal 
works performed by late Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. Mr 
Angeloni encouraged a stronger dialogue between academics 
and supervisors.
2. Is a Capital Markets Union needed?
The second session dealt with the Capital Markets Union 
(CMU). The CMU’s declared objective is to pursue deeper cap-
ital markets and enhance their integration to diversify sources 
of funding and provide an alternative to banks. Compared to 
the US, whose financing model relies more on financial mar-
kets – not to mention the 100% equity model of the Silicon 
Valley – Europe is characterised by a twin focus on bank 
financing and on debt financing (as opposed to market-based 
& equity financing). As one participant put it, both bank-based 
and market-based systems should however complement each 
other to fit the varying risk appetite of the demand side.  In 
this spirit, the audience seemed to agree that efforts towards a 
Banking Union and towards a CMU should go hand in hand. 
However, participants were puzzled by the exact meaning and 
regulatory implications of a CMU. Despite the merits of the 
recent Green Paper, its scope and precise building blocks are 
not yet clearly delineated. As such CMU risks falling short of 
expectations. This has led some to believe that, at best, it is in 
line with earlier reform mapping attempts like the Financial 
Services Action Plans or the Giovaninni Reports or, at worse, 
that it remains a mere PR exercise. Consensus gathered on 
the idea that the emergence of a genuine CMU in Europe is 
impeded by political, fiscal and most importantly legal factors. 
A key challenge lies with the co-existence of several national 
legal systems with their distinctive culture and logic; the per-
sistence of which is likely to hamper the convergence of capital 
markets regulation principles and practices. Insolvency law is a 
case in point. The argument was illustrated by the varying strin-
gency of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in Northern and 
Southern Europe as most recent CACs have been quite oddly 
written under local law. Lastly, delegates felt that the CMU will 
not improve SME’s market access as the latter are structurally 
attracted by bank financing because of their limited funding 
needs and information access. 
In contrast to the banking union – which resolutely entailed 
the centralization of powers in the hands of a supranational 
supervisor – the CMU appears, in its current form, as a legally 
Figure 2: Natacha Valla (CEPII), Mario Nava (EC), Brigid Laffan (EUI), Elena Carletti (Chair), Christos Hadjiemmanuil (LSE) 
and Sascha Steffen (ESMT)
1 The keynote speech is publicly available here.
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focussed endeavour to remove barriers to cross-border trade. 
Yet, one participant argued that the CMU would end up sooner 
or later with a genuine and centralized CMU supervisor. 
Another delegate insisted that in the future the discussion 
would revolve around the mandate and scope for action of a 
‘prudential markets’ supervisor and of its interaction with the 
banking supervisor. This will prove difficult as the two areas 
have different supervision logics: one focuses on actors (banks) 
while the other deals with activities (financial markets).  On the 
other extreme of the spectrum, some participants questioned 
whether one would really need a European capital markets 
union in the first place. Diversifying the funding of Europe’s 
economies could also be achieved within the realm of national 
markets. 
Figure 3: Ignazio Angeloni | European Central Bank
3. Single Market vs. Eurozone
The last session dealt with the inconsistencies and possible 
tension stemming from the existence of a dual EU-Euro Area 
regulatory system. The first point of possible friction would lie 
with the narrow focus of the BU’s SSM on the euro area. One 
participant explained that there are nine EU countries which 
are not part of the SSM. Yet, those nine countries host six out of 
the EU’s fifteen systemically important banks. Those six banks 
have subsidiaries in the euro area. He thus asked whether it 
was so unreasonable to expect regulatory inconsistencies 
between the EU and the Euro Area. Several speakers pointed, 
however, to the existing bridges between single market insti-
tutions and the banking union, outlining the latter’s openness 
to new participants. Asked whether non-SSM countries were 
likely to join in the future, one participant explained that the 
SSM is leaned very strongly on the ECB, which means that the 
ultimate decision-making powers of non-euro area members 
would be structurally weaker than Euro Area members if they 
decided to join (making this more unlikely). The existence of 
the European System of Financial Stability (ESFS) was greeted 
as a safeguard to prevent regulatory fragmentation. Yet, in 
addition, joint-stress tests across EU jurisdictions could be pro-
moted to avoid blind spots and the reinforcement of the Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board could be contemplated (e.g. through 
the creation of a permanent head); the ESRB is indeed the only 
EU-wide macro-prudential institution.  
Participants then considered the implications of the adopted 
capital requirements regulations for EU and Euro Area econ-
omies in view of possible divergences. While much of the 
immediate ‘fixing’ was done in the Euro Area, the EU level is 
however the level where the new Basel III requirements were 
transposed into law - through the Capital Requirements Direc-
tive IV and Capital Requirements Regulation. The aim was 
to increase the harmonization of prudential policies to avoid 
the build-up of financial instability risks (e.g. pro-cyclicality, 
too big too fail phenomena, contagion and fire-sale risks). As 
part of this development, the varying attitude towards capital 
requirements across EU and Euro Area countries (and before 
and after the crisis) was pointed out by a participant. Before the 
crisis, all EU Member States experienced a race to the bottom 
in the apparent belief that markets were self-regulating. After 
the crisis, the trend in some non-euro area countries seems to 
be opposite, i.e. one marked by ‘gold-plating’ capital require-
ments, doing more than necessary. 
Another dividing line is the differing approach towards fiscal 
policy. As a speaker highlighted, outside of the euro area, policy 
makers can coordinate effectively fiscal, monetary and pruden-
tial policies, while in the SSM world fiscal policies remain at the 
national level and are difficult to coordinate among themselves, 
let alone with the other policies. With the Six Pack, the fiscal 
interdependence (mostly) among euro area members has been 
recognised. Greater cooperation has been achieved, in par-
ticular against the background of financial stability spill-overs. 
By contrast, this awareness is not yet so developed among all EU 
countries. However, the mood was not alarmist about the frag-
mentation risk that the progressive deepening of the Euro Area 
would pose to countries remaining outside of the euro area. The 
argument was advanced that any regulatory effort performed 
at the level of the euro area would in any case amount to a de 
facto European harmonization. The point was thus made that 
one should stop treating the euro area as a single large Member 
State. In the absence of credible scenarios of Grexit and Brexit, 
antagonizing the EU and the Euro Area would thus constitute 
nothing more than an irrelevant distraction. 
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The Florence School of Banking & Finance
The Florence School of Banking & Finance is a European platform bringing together practitioners and academics from the 
Banking and Finance sector to develop a common culture of regulation and supervision in the European Union. It does so 
through policy debate, training and applied research and in close interaction with its network of leading academic institutions. 
Complete information on our activities can be found soon at:  fbf.eui.eu
Florence School of Banking & Finance
Robert Schuman Centre  
for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle 19
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